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Abstract 
Over the demographic transition, declining fertility leads to rising support ratios and 
consumption during the first dividend phase, followed by falling support ratios as 
population ages. Might human capital investments rise sufficiently as fertility falls to 
preserve the initial gains? Using a new cross-national data set, we estimate that a constant 
share of life time labor income is invested in human capital, so that the proportion 
invested per child is inversely proportional to the number of children. We draw from the 
literature an estimated elasticity of labor productivity with respect to human capital. 
Combining these, we simulate the effect of fertility variations over an exogenous 
demographic transition, including varying child and old age dependency, on 
consumption. In the baseline simulation, the increased human capital investments due to 
lower fertility initially reduce consumption as fertility falls but subsequently raise 
consumption despite population aging and increased transfers to the elderly. 
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Introduction  
Low fertility in Europe and East Asia is leading to important changes in age structure and 
to slowing or negative population growth.  The immediate impact of low fertility is to 
reduce the number of children in the population and to increase the share of the 
population concentrated in the working ages, raising the support ratio and 
correspondingly raising per capita income.  We refer to this phenomenon as the first 
demographic dividend; others use different language (Bloom and Canning, 2001; Kelley 
and Schmidt, 1995; Mason and Lee, 2006).  Later, as smaller cohorts of children reach 
the working ages, the share of the working age population declines, the share of the older 
adults increases, and the population ages.  The support ratio falls, reducing per capita 
income. These shifts of the population age distribution have important macroeconomic 
consequences that feature prominently in discussions of the economic outlook in Europe 
and elsewhere.  In Europe, however, the share and sometimes absolute number in the 
working ages is in decline raising concerns that the economic gains in recent decades will 
be lost.  While some consequences of the changing support ratios can be understood 
through straightforward accounting, others are subtler, including effects on accumulation 
of physical and human capital. 
 
A large literature spanning many decades explores other effects of these demographic 
changes. The conventional view is that low fertility and slower population growth will 
lead to increased capital intensity and higher per capita income.  These effects are 
mediated by changing savings rates and labor force growth rates (Modigliani and 
Brumberg, 1954; Tobin, 1967; Mason, 1987; Higgins and Williamson, 1997; Kelley and 
Schmidt, 1995; Lee et al, 2000).  In the standard Solow-Swan growth framework, low 
fertility leads to higher per capita consumption because slower labor force growth leads 
to capital deepening. This is the case if the saving rate is given (Solow 1956) or is 
golden-rule (Deardorff 1976).  Samuelson raised the possibility, however, that in a model 
with age distribution and a retirement stage, over some relevant range lower population 
growth may reduce welfare because workers will have to support a larger number of 
elderly (Samuelson 1975; 1976).  One purpose of this paper is to revisit Samuelson’s 
conjecture. Elsewhere we have argued that the response of life cycle saving when fertility 
and mortality are low will lead to an increased capital – labor ratio (a “second 
demographic dividend”) which offsets the growing burden of old age dependency, 
provided that old age is not too generously supported through public or familial transfer 
programs (Mason and Lee 2006).  
 
The effects of demographic change on human capital have received less attention, 
although there have certainly been important contributions, mostly but not entirely 
theoretical (e.g. Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990, Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; 
Jones, 2002; Montgomery, 2000).  To draw a simple parallel with the Solow-Swan 
model, a constant rate of investment in human capital inevitably leads to an increase in 
human capital per worker if labor force growth slows.  A deeper understanding of these 
processes, however, requires that two important issues be addressed.  The first is how 
investment in human capital affects economic growth.  The second issue, which receives 
more emphasis in this paper, is how demographic change interacts with investment in 
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human capital.  The central idea, however, is the following.  If small cohorts of workers 
have high levels of human capital because parents and/or taxpayers have invested more in 
each child, standards of living may rise despite the seemingly unfavorable age structure.    
 
The first contribution of this paper is to review previous research on the linkages 
between fertility, human capital, and economic growth so as to lay a foundation for the 
analysis that follows.  The objective is to distill an important and somewhat unsettled 
literature to provide focus on the important issue emphasized here.   
 
The second contribution is to offer new empirical evidence about the tradeoff 
between human capital investment and fertility based on data from the National Transfer 
Accounts (NTA) project (Lee, Lee and Mason 2008; Mason, Lee, Tung et al. 
forthcoming).  The paper will present new estimates of public and private spending on 
education and health for children for a cross-section of countries, considering only 
expenditures and not time costs.  It will answer the simple empirical question of whether 
lower fertility at the national level is associated with higher human capital investment per 
child and whether this holds for both public and private sector investment in human 
capital. We are not able to draw any inferences about causality. 
 
Based on these estimates and a simple model, we will then simulate the effects of 
changing fertility over the demographic transition on human capital, per capita GDP, and 
lifetime consumption, on the assumption that the estimated cross-sectional relationship 
.between fertility and human capital investments held throughout the transition and will 
hold in the future. We show that based on reasonable parameter estimates an increase in 
human capital associated with lower fertility may offset the greater cost of supporting the 
elderly in the older population. Because there is considerable uncertainty in the literature 
about the effects of education on growth at the national level, however, we cannot come 
to a definitive conclusion on this point. 
Quality expenditures and human capital 
In the literature on the quantity and quality of children (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Willis, 
1973), all expenditures on children are combined and treated as investments in child 
quality. In a later literature all parental expenditures on children are viewed as raising 
future earning prospects for children which is the operational definition of quality 
(Becker and Barro, 1988). Our approach here differs from this tradition. We suggest that 
some expenditures on children have mainly consumption value for those children and 
yield vicarious consumption value for the parents, while others augment the children’s 
human capital (HK). Specifically, we treat public and private expenditures on health care 
and on education as HK investment, and ignore all other kinds of expenditures on 
children, such as food, clothing, entertainment and housing.  
 
The extended theoretical treatment of investments in child quality (e.g. Willis 1973; 
Becker and Lewis 1973) views quality as produced by inputs of time and market goods 
and services. It would certainly be desirable to include parental time inputs in the 
production of HK, but National Transfer Accounts, our data source, do not include time 
use so we are not able to do so. Furthermore, the literature on investment in education 
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emphasizes the opportunity costs of the children who stay in school to receive further 
education, and often this is the only cost of education that is considered when private 
returns to schooling are estimated. These opportunity costs are certainly relevant, but for 
now we have included only direct costs in our measure.  
 
Increased investment in HK can take place at the extensive margin by raising 
enrollment rates, which implies higher opportunity costs as in the traditional analysis. But 
it can also take place at the intensive margin through greater expenditures per year of 
education, through variations in class size, complementary equipment, hours of education 
per day, or teacher quality and pay rate. In East Asia much of the private spending 
appears to be of this sort, as children are sent to cram schools or tutors after the public 
school education is completed for the day. Such increased expenditures do not 
necessarily have an opportunity cost of the sort measured in traditional studies, and the 
increase in years of schooling would underestimate the increase in HK investment. In 
Europe, on the other hand, education through apprenticeship may entail low costs and 
little lost time in the labor force. 
Cross-national Estimates of Human Capital Spending in 
Relation to Fertility 
The National Transfer Accounts project provides the requisite data on age patterns of 
human capital investments per child and labor income for eighteen economies, rich and 
poor: the US, Japan, Taiwan, S. Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Philippines, Chile, 
Mexico, Costa Rica, Uruguay, France, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary. 
Data are for various dates between 1994 and 2004. See Lee et al (2008) and Mason et al 
(in press). More detailed information is available at www.ntaccounts.org.  
 
For each country, we have age specific data on public and private spending per child for 
education and health. We sum spending per child on education across ages 0 to 26, 
separately for public and private. We do similarly for health care, but this time limit the 
age range to 0-17. These are synthetic cohort estimates. We also have data on labor 
income by age and we have calculated average values for ages 30-49, ages chosen to 
avoid effects of educational enrollment and early retirement on labor income. The data 
are averaged across all members of the population at each age, whether in the labor force 
or not, and include both males and females. They include fringe benefits and self 
employment income, and estimates for unpaid family labor which is very important in 
poor countries. We express the HK (human capital) expenditures relative to the average 
labor income. This is our basic estimate of human capital investment. For fertility we take 
the average Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for the most recent five year interval preceding the 
HK-NTA survey date, using United Nations quinquennial data. The TFR is also a 
synthetic cohort measure. 
 
<New Table 1 about here..>  
 
Figure 1 plots the natural log of total HK expenditures (that is, public and private, health 
and education, summed over the ages indicated above) per child relative to labor income 
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on the vertical axis, against the log of the Total Fertility Rate on the horizontal axis. The 
corresponding descriptive regression is:  
 
ln(HK) = 1.92– 1.05*ln(TFR),  R2 = .624 
     (.14)     (7.3) 
 
An elasticity of -1.0 would imply that a constant share of labor income is spent on human 
capital investments regardless of how many children a couple has, so that a country with 
a TFR of 3 would spend one third as much per child relative to labor income as a country 
with a TFR of 1. The point estimate for the elasticity is -1.05, which is not significantly 
different than -1.0.  
 
Further analysis indicates that this association results primarily from variations in public 
spending on education, and therefore it would not be apparent in micro-level analyses 
within countries. Heavy spending on private education is limited to Asia, where three 
countries spend more on private than on public. In Europe, all six NTA countries spend at 
least 7.5 times as much on public as on private, and none of the non-European NTA 
countries spends this much. There is also evidence of substitution between public and 
private spending on education across NTA countries.  
 
How the Empirical Pattern is Related to the Quantity-
Quality Tradeoffs Model 
In the basic quantity-quality tradeoff model of fertility choice (Becker and Lewis, 1973; 
Willis, 1973), a couple has the utility function u(x,n,q) where x is parental consumption, 
n is number of children, and q is the quality of each of the identical and symmetrically 
treated n children. For our purposes x includes all the ordinary consumption by the 
children as well as the parents. We reserve qpq=HK for human capital spending per child. 
The parents’ budget constraint is Y=pxx + pqnq, which is nonlinear in the numbers and 
quality of children.  
 
In pedagogical presentations of the model (Becker, 1991:Ch5 or Razin and Sadka, 
1995:Ch3) it is assumed for simplicity that the parents have already decided how to 
divide their income between own consumption and spending on children (which is pqnq), 
and the analysis focuses on the allocation of this chosen amount between numbers of 
children and spending on each, that is quantity and quality.  
 
Consider Figure 1 in light of standard quantity-quality tradeoff theory. We suggest that 
under a specific assumption, it shows us a meta budget constraint for the quantity quality 
tradeoff, in the sense that the quantity-quality choice point for any country will fall 
somewhere on this line. To see this, let n be the number of children, q be real human 
capital investments per child, and pq be the unit price of these investments. Then total HK 
spending (H for short) per child is qpq. Suppose a couple with total income Y chooses to 
allocate a proportion of it equal to γYθ for total investment in all children’s HK, so that the 
total expenditure on HK is γYθ+1. Now, just as we did for Figure 1, let us standardize the 
HK variable by dividing by the couple’s income, Y, giving us the proportion of their 
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income that is spent on each child’s HK. (We have actually divided by average labor 
income in Figure 1, but the factor of 120 can be folded into the coefficient γ.) We will 
call this standardized amount H*. We now have the equation:  
 
*Y H nθγ =  
 
Taking logs and rearranging, we find:  
 
(0.1) ( ) ( ) ( )*ln ln lnH n Yγ θ= +  
 
This suggests estimating the relation of the share of spending on HK relative to a 
couple’s income by regressing the ln(TFR*HK) on ln(Y) cross nationally. When we do 
this, we find (t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
Ln(H*n) = .57   +   .14 ln(Y)      R2 = .15 
     (0.75)      (1.75) 
 
The estimated on ln(Y) is insignificantly different than 0. Setting θ = 0 and rearranging, 
we get:  
  
(0.2) ( ) ( ) ( )*ln ln lnH nγ= −  
 
This is the relationship plotted in Figure 1. We interpret this, then, as a budget constraint 
common to the 19 NTA countries. Of these, different countries are located on different 
points along the budget constraint, for a wide variety of reasons.  
 
In our empirical exploration, we calculate the ratio of HK expenditure per child in money 
terms to the average labor income for age 30 to 49. A couple’s life time labor income in a 
synthetic cohort sense is 80 times this average, reflecting 40 years each of labor income 
for husband and wife. If labor income is two thirds of total household income Y then Y is 
roughly 120 times average labor income. The constant in the regression, 1.92, estimates 
ln(γ). Therefore γ is about 6.8, and the share of HK expenditures out of labor income is 
roughly 8.5% or 1/12 (=6.8/80) of life time labor income, or 5.7% of total income. 
 
The standard theory suggests that as income rises, fertility falls and investments in human 
capital rise, due to the interaction of quantity and quality in the budget constraint and the 
greater pure income elasticity of quality than of quantity. However, within the framework 
of the theory, there are a number of other factors that may influence the choice of fertility 
versus HK along the budget constraint. These include cultural differences in valuation of 
numbers versus quality; differences in the relative price of parental consumption, px and 
human capital, pq;. the changing availability of new parental consumption goods; 
differences in child survival; differences in the rate of return to education or by older age 
survival probabilities may influence choices. The model can be expanded to include a 
fixed price of number of children, pn, not shown in the equations above (see Becker, 
1991). Examples are financial incentives or disincentives for child bearing such as family 
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allowances in Europe or the fines of the one child policy in China. The availability of 
contraceptives can also be interpreted as influencing the price of numbers of children. 
 
For all these reasons and more, we can meaningfully consider the effects of an exogenous 
change in fertility on human capital investment, and the effects of an exogenous change 
in human capital investment on fertility. Furthermore, the list of factors suggests some 
possible instruments for identifying these effects, that could be useful in future research. 
In the simulations to which we turn later, we will take the time path of fertility as 
exogenously determined, and attempt to trace out its implications for human capital 
investment and income growth.  
Education and Economic Growth in Recent Theoretical 
and Empirical Literature 
In a prominent article, Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) assign a central role to human 
capital as the main driver of economic growth, with output of consumption goods 
proportional to the stock of human capital (constant returns), and human capital per child 
proportional to the human capital of the parent generation. If it escapes a Malthusian trap, 
then the system converges to a steady state growth path with constant fertility, growing 
human capital per person, and a growing rate of return to human capital. In models of this 
sort human capital obviously has a very important role and declining fertility could 
apparently lead to faster aggregate economic growth.  
 
In the endogenous growth model of Jones (2002), some returns to education are captured 
by the national economy, but the biggest payoff is global and shared, with population 
growth raising the numbers of educated people participating in research and 
development, which drives global technological progress. Fertility reduction in one 
country would permit greater investments in HK per child and higher per capita income, 
and the country could continue to benefit from new ideas generated abroad. A global 
downturn in population growth would probably reduce per capita income growth in this 
model, however, although it is hard to be sure, since Jones does not link population 
growth and per capita investments in education.  
 
A large empirical literature assesses the individual and aggregate returns to investment in 
education. Most of the literature estimates private rates of return to education based 
primarily on the opportunity cost of the time of the student who invests in an incremental 
year of education, although sometimes tuition costs are also included. Card (1999) 
provides an analytic overview of this literature and reviews many IV studies, finding that 
in general the IV studies report even higher rates of return to education than do the OLS 
studies, with a broad range centered on about 8% per year. Heckman et al (2008) 
estimates rates of return for the US based on extended Mincer-type regressions allowing 
for various complications, and also including tuition, but without IV to deal with the 
endogeneity of schooling. They report rates of return in the range 10 to 15% or higher for 
the contemporary US (for a college degree, given that one already has a high school 
degree).  
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For our purposes this literature has two main problems: it focuses exclusively on the 
extensive margin of years of schooling (as opposed to increased investment at a given 
age) and it focuses exclusively on private rates of return rather than including social rates 
of return, which could be higher (due to externalities) or lower (due to inclusion of direct 
costs). 
 
Another literature assesses the effect of education on per capita income or income growth 
rates at the aggregate level. These estimates should reflect both full costs of education 
and spillover effects. One approach treats HK in a way similar to K, as a factor of 
production for which an output elasticity can be estimated. Studies taking this approach 
sometimes report similar estimated elasticities of output with respect to labor, HK, and K 
(e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Lau, 1996). Another approach views HK as raising 
the rate at which technological changes can be adopted so HK is said to raise the growth 
rate of output rather than its level (Nelson and Phelps, 1966).  
 
The earning functions fit on individual data are generally specified in semi-logarithmic 
form, which suggests that the underlying function linking the wage w to years of 
schooling has the form: Ew eψ= where ψ is the rate of return to years of education E. This 
suggests that human capital H or HK in relation to schooling level also has this form. 
Cross-national estimates of aggregate production functions including human capital as an 
input, from this perspective, should have the form 1 1( ) ( )EY AK HL AK e Lα α α ψ α− −= = , 
where L is the labor force and HL is therefore the total amount of human capital given 
(Jones, 2002).  
 
However, this is not the form that these cross-national regressions take. Instead, variables 
like median years of schooling completed or proportions enrolled in secondary education 
are used to measure H (e.g. Mankiw et al, 1992 or Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004:524). 
The difference is important. Under the exponential version, the human capital increment 
associated with the 15th year of schooling is four or five times larger than that associated 
with the first year of schooling, when ψ =.1. Our analysis, not shown here, concludes that 
when we take into account the time costs of schooling at the aggregate level, the micro 
approach described above implies aggregate level output elasticities that are in the 
neighborhood of one third. Therefore our baseline assumption is an elasticity of .33 for 
output with respect to human capital. 
A Simple Model of Fertility, HK investment, and 
Economic Growth 
Here we develop a simple model of a population with three age groups, children, 
workers, and retirees.  Only children and workers are relevant to human capital and wage 
dynamics. Later, the number of retirees becomes important when we balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of low fertility.  
 
In what follows, H is human capital investment per child, subscripted by the children’s 
generation, t. F is the Net Reproduction Ratio per generation, so survival from birth to 
adulthood is folded into it, although we will refer to it as “fertility” for simplicity. It is 
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subscripted by the parental generation. W is the wage of the working generation, that is 
parents. Nx is the size of generation x, where x=0,1,2 refers to children, workers and 
retirees, respectively. T is the total wage bill indexed on generation of current workers.  
 
In our simple model the births of one period are the workers of the next period.  We do 
not distinguish between the working age population, N1, and the labor force, L.  
11 1t t tN F N+ = . 
Here time is measured in generations.  The proportion of workers surviving to retirement 
is s:  N2t+1 = st Nt.   
 
Investment in human capital relative to parental generation wages is a function of the 
level of parental fertility: 
( )1t t tH W h F+ =  = expenditure on human capital H relative to wages W by parental 
generation t per child in generation t+1. Thus when the parental generation has more 
education, and hence a higher wage, their children will receive greater HK investment at 
any level of fertility.  
( )t tW g H=  gives wage as a function of human capital equal to the amount of HK 
investment a generation received in the preceding period. 
Therefore:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1t t t t tH h F W h F g H+ = =  
 ( )1 1t tW g H+ +=  
(0.3) ( )1t t tW g h F W+ ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
Note that these equations introduce a lag of one generation between investment in the 
human capital of a generation of children and its effect on their labor productivity when 
they enter the labor force.  
 
The growth rate of total wages is:  
  
(0.4) ( )1t t t t t tT T F g h F W W+ ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
Now consider the special case in which g and h are constant elasticity functions, as 
follows:  
( )t th F F βα=  
( )1 1t tg H H δγ+ +=  
 
Then we have the growth rate of wages:  
(0.5) ( ) 11t t t tW W F Wδ βδ δα γ −+ =  
 
Noting that βδ<0, we have the plausible result that for a given level of parental human 
capital and wages, lower fertility leads to higher wages in the next generation. Closely 
related to this result, we see that lower fertility leads to higher wage rate growth from 
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generation to generation. We also see that the growth rate of wages is inversely 
proportional to the initial level of wages, for a given level of fertility.  
 
We can also find the equilibrium level of wages, Wˆ  for a given level of fertility by 
setting the growth ratio to unity:  
(0.6) ( )
1
1 11 ˆ
tF W
δ βδ δ
δα γ
− −⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Since βδ<0, this expression tells us that higher fertility is associated with lower wages in 
equilibrium, with an empirical elasticity of roughly -.5 (since estimated β=-1 and δ=1/3, 
the exponent of F is -.5). 
 
We can also find the growth rate of total wages, or the wage bill: 
(0.7) 1 11t t t tT T W F
δ δ βδα γ − ++ =   
 
Our descriptive elasticity of fertility and HK was close to -1. This non-causal estimate 
suggests that β<0 (higher fertility leads to lower HK investments), while other estimates 
establish that δ>0 (higher human capital leads to higher wages). Given our descriptive 
estimate of β, it seems highly likely that 1+βδ>0. From equation (0.7), this suggests that 
lower fertility will raise the rate of growth of the wage bill (and presumably GDP). 
 
We also see that a higher value of parental wages, Wt, leads to a lower rate of growth of 
the wage bill, so long as δ<1 which is very likely to be satisfied. This reflects 
diminishing returns to human capital, so that the greater the human capital of the parental 
generation, the smaller the wage gain from investing more in their children’s human 
capital.  
 
To this point we have focused our attention exclusively on the dynamic inter-relationship 
between wages, human capital, and fertility.  Although this is the driving force in our 
analysis, the outcomes of particular interest are per capita income and consumption.  In 
the simple OLG model employed here the wage is equivalent to lifetime earnings.  In the 
absence of intergenerational transfers, the wage would be equivalent to lifetime 
consumption.  A decline in fertility would unambiguously lead to an increase in lifetime 
consumption or the standard of living.  The reality is that intergenerational transfers are 
pervasive.  Consumption by children is almost exclusively financed through 
intergenerational transfers.  Analysis of the sources of support for the elderly in the 
National Transfer Accounts project have to this point identified only one country – 
Thailand – in which the elderly rely on intergenerational transfers for less than half of 
their support.   
 
In the simple theoretical model employed here, the consumption of children and the 
elderly is supported exclusively by intergenerational transfers.  This is a highly stylized 
and unrealistic assumption, but it is useful to consider whether low fertility could lead to 
lower consumption under these extreme circumstances, i.e., if the elderly are supported 
entirely by transfers from workers.  
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The relationship between the wage in this simple model and per capita income is readily 
incorporated into recent research on age structure and per capita income growth (Bloom 
et al., KS) that emphasizes the share of the working age population in the total.  In this 
model we know that the relationship between the wage and per capita income is given by:   
(0.8) ( )1/   t t t t tGNP N w N N=   
Where the demographic variable in parentheses on the right-hand-side is the ratio of the 
working-age population to the total population.   
 
Earlier we discussed changes in the working-age population during the demographic 
transition and the first demographic dividend, followed by population aging. These are 
discussed in more detail below in the context of our simulations.   
 
The evolution of consumption over the demographic transition is very important because 
different development paths require that current generations forego consumption to 
varying degrees.  To do so involves sacrifice of current living standards.  Analysis of 
income rather than consumption ignores this fundamental tradeoff.   
 
Changes in per capita consumption deviate from changes in wages for two reasons.  One 
reason is compositional, that is the first demographic dividend.  This is incorporated into 
the analysis in a straightforward way, similar to the way that age structure influences 
GNP per capita.  A second issue is that the share of GNP (or the wage) that is consumed 
varies with the rate at which production is invested in human capital.  Note that in many 
analyses and in national income and product account human capital investment is treated 
as consumption.  Here we treat it as investment.  Altruistic parents derive utility 
indirectly from the anticipated effect that investment in their children’s human capital 
will have on their children’s future productivity and wellbeing, but the human capital 
expenditures would not yield this indirect utility were they not investments.  
 
Our model is easily extended to include consumption by subtracting from total wages the 
amount spent on human capital investment:   
 
(0.9) 0 ( )t t t t tC T w N h F= −   
The share of aggregate production that is consumed is given by:  
 
(0.10) 1 ( )t t t tC T F h F= −   
 
In our constant elasticity special case, this becomes:  
 
(0.11) 11t t tC T F
βα += −   
 
The consumption rate is either increasing or decreasing in F depending on the elasticity 
of human capital spending with respect to F.  In the simplest case emphasized above, the 
elasticity β is -1, so 1+β=0 and human capital spending as a share of total income is 
constant at 1-α, and, hence, the consumption ratio is constant.   
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From equation 2, the growth rate of consumption is given by: 
 
(0.12) 11 1
1
1
11
1t t t t
t
t
F
C C W F
F
δ δ β
β
β
δα γ αα
+
+− +
+ +
−= −   
The right-hand-side ratio captures the period to period change in the consumption ratio.  
If 1β = −  the ratio is equal to 1 and the change in consumption is equal to the change in 
wage bill.   
 
To complete the picture we must also incorporate into the analysis that consumption 
“needs” vary with age.  Thus, to track consumption we use consumption per equivalent 
adult.   
 
(0.13)  0 2/ ( )t t t t tc C a N0 N1 a N2= + +  
 
Simulation Analysis 
The simulation treats the elasticity of human capital investment per child with respect to 
fertility in our descriptive regression as if it were the true causal elasticity, such that 
exogenous variations in fertility would generate the corresponding changes in human 
capital investment. The simulations take all demographic variables, fertility and adult 
survival, as exogenous.  The parameters, their values, and sources are provided in Table 
2. Note that there is no technological progress in this simulation. Changes in wage levels 
and consumption result entirely from changing population age distribution and changing 
investments in human capital. 
 
<Table 2 about here>  
 
The baseline simulation analyzes the transition in F, the NRR, from a peak value of 2.0, 
to replacement level, F=1, after one period.  Fertility continues to decline for two periods 
reaching a minimum of 0.6.  Thereafter, fertility gradually recovers eventually reaching 
replacement level.   The baseline simulation also incorporates a rapid transition in adult 
mortality with the proportion surviving to old age rising from 0.3 to 0.8 over the course 
of the demographic transition.   
 
The model is initialized by assuming that a pre-transition steady-state existed in t = -2.  
The NRR increased from 1.2 in t = -2 at a constant rate to reach 2 in t =0, reflecting 
declining infant and child mortality.  Adult survival is held constant during this period.  
The age structure at t = 0 reflects these early demographic changes.   
 
The key demographic variables are presented in Table 3. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
The simulation covers seven periods (generations) or roughly two centuries during which 
there are three distinct phases, as follows:   
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Boom:  Temporarily high net fertility which leads to an increase in the share of the 
population in the working ages as measured either by the percentage of the population 
who are workers or the support ratio.1  The boom lasts for a single generation of thirty 
years.2   
 
Decline:  Declining fertility is leading to a decline in the share of the working age 
population and the support ratio.  In the simulation this lasts for two generations or 
approximately 60 years.  
 
Recovery:  The share of the working age population and the support ratio rise as a 
consequence rising fertility with a one generation lag.  In the baseline simulation, 
recovery last for two generations or approximately 60 years.   
 
For the final two periods of the simulation, net fertility is held constant at the replacement 
rate.   
 
Note that the timing of fertility decline and recovery are not based on any particular 
historical experience.  A number of countries have reached very low fertility rates similar 
to those in the baseline simulation, but it is unknown when they might recover.  Japan has 
had a TFR of 1.5 or less for almost two decades at this point. 
 
Table 4 reports human capital variables for the baseline simulation.  The share of the 
wage or labor income invested in the human capital of each child is reported in the first 
column.  Human capital spending per child is low in period 0 because there are so many 
children relative to the number of workers.  The investment in human capital in children 
in period 0 is actually less than the human capital of the current generation of workers 
who were members of a smaller cohort.  The large cohort enters the workforce in period 
1 leading to the first demographic dividend.  Note that the average wage has declined 
from period 0 to 1 because members of the large cohort have less human capital than the 
previous generation of workers.  During the first dividend period, then, the favorable 
impact of the entry of a large cohort of workers is moderated because the large cohort is 
disadvantaged with respect to its human capital.   
 
The impact of low fertility on human capital occurs during the fertility decline phase.  
Human capital spending per child increases from 4.7 percent of the average adult’s wage 
in period 0 to 10.0 percent in period 1 to 17.5 percent in period 2.  With a one generation 
lag this leads to greater human capital and a higher wage.  The peak in human capital 
investment per child is reached in period 2 and the peak in human capital is reached in 
period 3.   
 
                                                 
1 The support ratio is calculated as the number of workers adjusted for age variation in productivity divided 
by the number of consumer adjusted for age variation in consumption “needs”. 
2 Using more detailed age data, estimates of the first dividend stage are typically between one and two 
generations long.  For East and Southeast Asia, a region with rapid fertility decline, Mason estimates the 
first dividend period lasts 46 years on average.  
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Note that the trend in human capital investment depends both on the share of the wage 
invested in human capital per child and also on the wage.  Thus, human capital has a 
multiple effect.  The wage or the human capital of the current generation of workers 
depends on the human capital investment they received and also the human capital 
investment received by their parents’ generation.   
 
During the recovery period fertility is rising and, hence, human capital investment is 
declining.  With a lag the human capital of the workforce declines as does the average 
wage until an equilibrium is reached at replacement fertility.   
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
Key macroeconomic results are reported in Figure 2.  The support ratio is of interest 
because it marks the three demographic phases of interest and also because it tells us how 
consumption and income would vary in the absence of investment, human capital or 
otherwise.  If all labor income is consumed and none invested, consumption per 
equivalent adult exactly tracks the support ratio.  Following the boom period labor 
income would increase by about 20 percent. Thereafter, foregoing the second dividend, 
fertility decline would have a severe effect leading to a decline in consumption by one-
third.  As fertility recovers and the working population rises relative to the older 
population, consumption would recover but only to about 5 percent below the pre-
transition level.  Thus, the first dividend would not only be entirely transitory but very 
low fertility would have a strongly adverse effect on standards of living with a one 
generation lag.   
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
With human capital investment the outcome is very different.  GNP per capita grows 
about as rapidly as the support ratio during the first dividend period.  However, 
consumption per equivalent adult consumer grows much more slowly because much of 
the gain in per capita output is invested in human capital. The returns on this investment 
are realized in the next two periods when consumption rises at the same time that the 
support ratio falls due to population aging. At the peak GNP per capita is 50 percent 
above the pre-transition level.  Per capita GNP declines as fertility increases and spending 
on human capital declines, but per capita GNP stabilizes at a level about forty percent 
above the pre-transition level. 
 
Consumption per equivalent adult rises much more slowly than per capita GNP or the 
support ratio during the boom period. The reason for this is two-fold.  First, the share of 
GNP devoted to human capital increases moderately so less is available for consumption.  
Second, the decline in the relative number of children has a larger impact on per capita 
GNP (children count as 1) than on C per equivalent adult (children count as 0.5).  
Thereafter consumption per equivalent adult rises markedly achieving a 20 percent 
increase as compared with period 0.  Consumption stabilizes at a higher level – between 
15 and 20% above the pre-dividend level.   
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They key feature of this simulation is that human capital investment has allowed the first 
dividend to be converted into a second dividend.  The affects of population aging are 
reversed as large cohorts of less productive members are replaced with small cohorts of 
more productive members.  
 
Variations in parameters and demographics 
How sensitive are the results to variations in parameter values and demographic 
variables?  We have carried out a variety of sensitivity tests for variations in the values of 
the key elasticities. If the elasticity of investment with respect to fertility is set at -1.5 
rather than the -1 of baseline, then the consumption gains from low fertility are greatly 
increased. If the elasticity is set at -.7 then the gains are much reduced and consumption 
more nearly tracks the support ratio. When the elasticity of the wage with respect to 
human capital is set at .5 versus the baseline value of .33, the benefits of fertility decline 
are much larger, but when it is set at .16 the benefits of low fertility vanish in the long 
term, and population aging overwhelms the higher labor productivity. When the two high 
(in absolute value) elasticities are used at the same time, the effects on consumption are 
three or four times as great as baseline. When the two low values are used, however, 
consumption tracks the support ratio quite closely and the gains from low fertility are 
small. Clearly the results depend on the parameter values.  
 
A final set of simulations explores how features of the fertility transition influence the 
path of consumption given the baseline parameters values (Figure 3).  Three scenarios are 
considered.  In the first, the fertility rate declines slowly, over two generations rather than 
one, to replacement level and declines no further.  In the second scenario fertility declines 
rapidly, over one generation, to replacement fertility and declines no further.  In the third 
scenario, fertility declines slowly to sub-replacement level, 0.6 as in the baseline 
scenario, and recovers at a speed similar to that in the baseline.  Note that in all cases the 
demography at the end of the simulation is identical.  Hence, steady-state consumption 
per equivalent adult will be the same at the end of the simulations.  Our interest here is in 
the paths to that steady-state.  In the simulation results presented here steady-state has not 
yet been entirely realized.  By period 9 (not charted) steady-state has been reached with 
consumption per equivalent adult 16 percent higher than in period 0.   
 
Perhaps the most striking difference in the simulations is that the slow fertility transition 
to replacement fertility, given the baseline parameter values, results in a consumption 
path that declines when the first large birth cohort enters the workforce and only begins 
to increase when the second large birth cohort enters the workforce in period 2.  In this 
scenario the rise in the old age population never is sufficient to depress consumption per 
equivalent adult.  In the other three scenarios, consumption declines in one period 
because of the increase in the share of the population at older ages.     
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
Conclusion 
A number of potentially important issues related to changes in population age structure 
are explored in this paper, albeit in a very preliminary way. The key idea is that it is 
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insufficient to focus on the relative number of people in age groups.  The productivity of 
those individuals also matters.  Because investment in human capital and fertility are 
closed connected, the total amount produced by a cohort will not decline in proportion to 
its numbers.  Indeed, it is possible that it could rise as cohort size falls.  
 
In the context of the demographic transition the potential tradeoff between productivity 
and numbers raises interesting questions.  First, does the first dividend have a diminished 
effect on per capita income because the large entering cohorts of workers will have lower 
human capital per capita than preceding cohorts?  Second, is investment in human capital 
a mechanism by which the first dividend can be invested in future generations – 
generating a lasting second dividend?  The third question concerns Samuelson’s 
conjecture.  Does lower fertility and slower population growth always lead to higher 
standards of living or can fertility be too low in the sense that rising old age dependency 
ratios more than offset the human capital gains?  
 
The implication of rising fertility for human capital investment and economic growth is 
relevant at two points over the demographic transition as modeled in this paper.  Before 
childbearing begins to decline the net reproduction rate increases due to reduced infant 
and child mortality.  Also during the recovery period the rise in fertility leads to a decline 
in human capital investment.  In both cases rising fertility leads to an increase in the share 
of the working population and a demographic dividend, but one that will be more modest 
if the larger generation of workers is less productive than the preceding one.  This is an 
interesting possibility but the evidentiary base is weak.  The data used to estimate the 
tradeoff between fertility and human capital investment come from countries that differ in 
the extent to which their fertility rates have declined, but no country is represented prior 
to the onset of fertility decline or at early stages of the decline.  The existence and 
magnitude of the quantity-quality tradeoff may be very different during other phases of 
the demographic transition and dividend.   
 
Our empirical results suggest that human capital expenditures per child are substantially 
higher where fertility is lower, to the extent that the product of the Total Fertility Rate 
and human capital spending per child is roughly a constant share of labor income across 
countries, although total spending per child falls with fertility. About one twelfth of 
parental life time labor income is spent on human capital investments, in countries like 
Austria, Slovenia, Hungary and Japan with TFRs near one, and in poorer countries like 
Uruguay with a TFR of 2.5 or the Philippines with a TFR of 3.6 (at the time of 
observation in Figure 1). This suggests that during the demographic transition, a portion 
of the first demographic dividend is invested in human capital, reinforcing the economic 
benefits of fertility decline. It also suggests that the very low fertility in some countries 
like Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Japan, Taiwan or S. Korea is associated with an 
increased human capital investment per child that might reduce or at least postpone the 
support problems brought on by population aging.  
 
Second, human capital investment is a potentially important mechanism by which a 
second demographic dividend can be generated.  Fertility decline leads to substantial 
population aging and a rising dependency burden.  As measured by the support ratio, the 
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dependency burden can be as great or greater at the end of the transition as at the 
beginning. Although we have not emphasized this feature of the simulation model, the 
transfers from workers to the elderly are very substantial at the end of the transition.  
Standards of living as measured by consumption per equivalent adult can be sustained at 
relatively high levels, however, if the quantity-quality tradeoff is sufficiently strong and if 
human capital has a sufficiently strong effect on productivity.  If the rate of growth is 
raised sufficiently by human capital investments, then even the share of output 
transferred to the elderly need not rise much.  
 
The third issue is whether slower population growth is always better.  This question can 
be answered using simulation results not reported in the main body of the paper.  We 
allowed the elasticity of human capital with respect to fertility to vary as in the sensitivity 
analysis reported above.  Steady-state consumption per equivalent adult was calculated 
using NRRs of 1.2, 1, 0.8, and 0.6.  If the elasticity of output with respect to human 
capital is set to the baseline value of 0.33, slower population growth leads to higher 
consumption per equivalent adult for any of the elasticities used to measure the quantity-
quality tradeoff.  If the elasticity of output with respect to human capital is set to 0.16 
(well below the level implied by rate of return estimates as discussed earlier), and if the 
elasticity of human capital with respect to fertility is set to -0.7 rather than -1.0, however, 
consumption per equivalent adult is higher for an F of 1 than for an F of 0.8 or 1.2.   
 
There are many important qualifications that should be kept in mind in considering these 
results.  First, the model of the economy is highly stylized in several important respects.  
We do not allow for capital, although this is an issue that we have explored extensively 
elsewhere.  There is no technological innovation, although we believe this can be 
introduced with little effect on the conclusions.  By using only three age groups we are 
relying on a very unrealistic characterization of the population and the economy.  A 
model with much greater detail would be better suited to providing a quantitative 
assessment of the issues being explored here, and we believe we can construct one from 
the building blocks introduced here.   
 
Second, the role of human capital in economic growth is unsettled in the literature.  
Estimates of the importance of human capital vary widely.  It is very likely that the effect 
of human capital varies across countries depending on a host of factors that are not 
explored here.  At this point we can do no better than allow for a wide range of possible 
effects.   
 
Third, the empirical basis for quantifying the quantity-quality tradeoff is also weak, 
although it is widely accepted that such a tradeoff exists.  An interesting result here is that 
the tradeoff is a feature of public spending rather than private spending.  Caution should 
be exercised in interpreting the results presented here because we are not asserting any 
particular causal relationship between fertility and human capital.  Thus it would be quite 
inappropriate to argue for fertility policy of any sort based on the simple cross-sectional 
relationship between human capital spending and fertility.  We are only saying that 
countries with lower fertility are spending more on human capital per child.  Because this 
is so, low fertility and population aging may not have the adverse affects on standards of 
 19
living that are widely anticipated.  This conclusion holds even though the elderly rely 
entirely on transfers from workers for their material support.  
  
Population aging entails growing transfers from workers to the elderly in industrial 
nations today, through rising payroll tax rates and family support burdens. These transfers 
are becoming increasingly painful. It may ease that pain to realize that this same 
population aging is intrinsic to the processes that continue to bring us an highly educated 
population and comfortable standards of living. We can’t have one without the other. 
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Figure 1.  Per Child HK Spending (Public and Private) 
vs. Fertility
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Figure 2. Macro Indicators: Baseline Results
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Figure 3. Consumption per equivalent adult, 
alternative fertility scenarios
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Table 1.  Human capital spending and components, recent years, countries for which 
National Transfer Account estimates are available.   
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Human capital  3.73 1.17 6.21 
  Health 0.54 0.17 0.94 
    Health, public 0.33 0.09 0.52 
    Health, private 0.21 0.01 0.50 
  Education 3.18 0.52 5.44 
    Education, public 2.32 0.16 4.99 
    Education, private 0.86 0.05 3.60 
Note.  All values are normalized on annual per capita labor income of persons in the age 
group 30-49. 
Source.  National Transfer Accounts, www.ntaccounts.org. 
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Table 2.  Parameter values and sources.  
 Value Source 
α  0.1 
In data, spending was 3.8 years worth of prime adult labor income; total 
years of prime age adult labor was 39.4.  Investment rate of 3.8/39.4 = 
approximately 0.1.     
β  -1.1 Regression from NTA estimates.  See text. 
γ  1 Arbitrary (doesn’t matter) 
δ  0.33 Mankiw, Romer, and Weil; consistent with micro–level empirical literature when translated into macro context. 
0a  0.5 Estimated NTA consumption profile for developing countries. 
2a  1.0 Estimated NTA consumption profile for developing countries.  
  
 
Table 3.  Demographic Variables, Baseline Simulation       
        
  Percent of population 
Period NRR 
Survival to 
old age Growth rate Children Workers Elderly 
Support 
ratio 
0 2.0 0.3 0.019 62.7 31.4 8.8 0.457 
1 1.0 0.6 0.012 43.5 43.5 5.9 0.556 
2 0.6 0.8 0.001 25.0 41.7 13.0 0.476 
3 0.8 0.8 -0.008 25.5 31.9 33.3 0.366 
4 1.0 0.8 -0.009 33.3 33.3 42.6 0.400 
5 1.0 0.8 -0.002 35.7 35.7 33.3 0.435 
6 1.0 0.8 0.000 35.7 35.7 28.6 0.435 
 
 
Table 4. Human Capital Variables     
Period 
Human capital 
spending per 
child/Wage Wage 
Human 
capital 
spending per 
child 
Average  
human capital  
of workers 
Human 
capital 
spending/ 
GDP 
0 Boom 0.047 0.263 0.012 0.017 0.093 
1 0.100 0.234 0.023 0.012 0.100 
2 
Decline 
0.175 0.290 0.051 0.023 0.105 
3 0.128 0.374 0.048 0.051 0.102 
4 
Recovery 
0.100 0.367 0.037 0.048 0.100 
5 0.100 0.336 0.034 0.037 0.100 
6  0.100 0.326 0.033 0.034 0.100 
 
